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Abstract
Given their backgrounds in classical ethology and in comparative psychology, researchers who study animal personality in biology
and psychology, respectively, differ in how they measure personality, what questions they see as important, and how they address
these questions. Despite these differences, both comparative psychologists and biologists embrace personality traits. By doing so,
they have solved empirical and conceptual problems in animal behavior. Studies of animal personality have provided answers to
questions about the evolution of human personality and have presented conceptual and empirical anomalies for sociocognitive
theories. Animal personality research does not break from trait theories of personality. Instead, it enriches trait theories by
conceiving of traits as not belonging to a species, but as expressed, with some modifications, across species. Broadening trait
theory in this way has the potential to further enhance its ability to answer questions related to animal and human personality.
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The report of my death was an exaggeration.
—Mark Twain, New York Journal, June 2, 1897
The central question of this special issue concerns the status
of traits in modern personality science. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to demonstrate that trait theory excels in solving problems
related to personality evolution in animals. To do so, the article
begins by reviewing the history of the trait–situation debate,
revealing that trait theory has never been a paradigm, in crisis, or
overthrown by an interactionist or sociocognitive paradigm.
This article then shows how biologists have incorporated trait
theory into a research tradition used to understand the evolution-
ary and mechanistic bases of behavioral variation in nonhuman
animals. Following this, the article discusses how this research
tradition has been less successful in solving problems about the
evolution of human personality, possibly because researchers in
the area developed hypotheses without attending to the animal
literature, and shows how problems related to the evolution of
human personality can be addressed by studies of animal per-
sonality. The article concludes by discussing the ability of trait
theory and sociocognitive theories of personality to solve con-
ceptual problems and suggests ways in which trait theories from
psychology can accommodate animal personality research.
To start, the lore in personality psychology that was passed on
to me was that early on in the history of modern personality
research, trait theory was the predominant paradigm. During that
era, personality researchers failed to take note of, marginalized,
or ignored the effects of situations on behavior. The story then
goes on to say that in 1968, Walter Mischel’s book Personality
and Assessment exposed the folly of ignoring the effects of the
situation in favor of the effects of traits, namely, as traits only
weakly affected behavior. Finally, a scientiﬁc revolution was
said to have taken place, and trait theory was replaced by a new
interactionist paradigm, and then, according to some accounts, it
returned with the advent of the Big Five or Five-Factor Model.
Based on ﬁndings from studies of animal personality, I came
to question the above history of personality psychology and the
notion that trait theory is inadequate for personality science and
should be revised or replaced. In hindsight, I should not have
been surprised that such an overly simplistic, Kuhnian history of
the ﬁeld of personality psychology was not an accurate retelling
of events. As is true in many scientiﬁc disciplines (Brush, 1974),
the history presented to students of personality psychology is
sanitized. There are many motives for presenting science stu-
dents with sanitized histories of their ﬁeld, among them the
desire to instill in students the need to be neutral, unbiased
observers, and to test hypotheses using the scientiﬁc method
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(Brush, 1974, p. 1164). Unfortunately, presenting a sanitized
history comes at the expense of recognizing other considerations
that play a role when scientists evaluate theories, including aes-
thetics, ﬁndings in other ﬁelds, and the subjective weighting of
existing ﬁndings (Brush, 1974, pp. 1168–1169; Chang, 2012).
So how has the history of personality psychology been sani-
tized? For one, despite claims to the contrary (e.g., Uher, 2013),
including by Walter Mischel (2009), the history of personality
psychology did not precede in a Kuhnian fashion—that is, it is
not one of normal science (the trait paradigm) followed by crisis
and revolution (the publication of Personality and Assessment
and its aftermath) followed by a new paradigm.
To show that the modern history of personality psychology
does not ﬁt a Kuhnian narrative, one has to determine whether
anything like a paradigm existed in the ﬁeld. One also has to
determine whether there was a crisis (see, e.g., Leahey, 1992).
By paradigm, Kuhn (1970) referred to broad assumptions
that are universally held by researchers in a ﬁeld. These assump-
tions include, for example, how to measure phenomena, what
phenomena one should study, and what phenomena one should
ignore (Kuhn, 1970). According to Kuhn, during periods in
which a paradigm rules a scientiﬁc ﬁeld, there is consensus
among researchers. One way in which the consensus is mani-
fested is in a ﬁeld’s textbooks: During periods of normal science,
a ﬁeld’s textbooks serve as guides to conducting research within
the paradigm and are not compendiums of past and present theo-
ries (Kuhn, 1970). Take, as an example, Plomin, DeFries, Kno-
pik, and Neiderhiser’s (2013) textbook on behavioral genetics.
It begins with chapters on genetic inheritance and similarity
among relatives. Next, it describes how to determine, by quanti-
tative and molecular methods, the extent to which genes inﬂu-
ence traits. These chapters are followed by examples of how one
or more of these methods were used to understand the genetic
(and environmental) bases of various traits and disorders. How-
ever, at some point, the discovery of a phenomenon or phenom-
ena that are inconsistent with the theories of the normal science
leads to a crisis, and it becomes ever more difﬁcult for the theory
to explain these anomalies (Kuhn, 1970). This crisis is resolved
by the emergence of a new theory, which explains both the
anomalies and the observations of the previous theory (Kuhn,
1970).
Throughout its history, personality psychology has been
marked by prominent, competing personality theories and a
decided lack of consensus. For example, prior to the publication
of Personality and Assessment (Mischel, 1968), there were psy-
chodynamic and trait theories of personality. In addition,
although the most prominent among these disagreements was
the person–situation debate, which Personality and Assessment
helped spark (Kenrick & Funder, 1988), there existed (and still
exist) disagreements, even among trait theorists, about, for
example, the structure of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992a,
1992b; Eysenck, 1992a, 1992b) and whether personality matu-
ration is attributable to genetic and biological causes (McCrae &
Costa, 2003) or a response to taking on societal roles, such as
becoming a parent or beginning work (Roberts, Wood, & Smith,
2005). This ongoing lack of consensus in personality psycholo-
gy is reﬂected in personality textbooks, which, unlike those in
paradigmatic sciences, such as behavior genetics, are not guides
to working within a paradigm, but, instead, summaries of vari-
ous theories and perspectives.
The historical record is also at odds with claims that
Mischel’s (1968) book led to a crisis. Kenrick and Funder
(1988, p. 23) noted that clashes between psychologists who
favored trait versus situational approaches to personality were
ongoing before 1968. Moreover, contrary to what one might
expect if Personality and Assessment led to a crisis period in per-
sonality psychology, reviews of the book were mostly positive
(Aiken, 1968; Beech, 1969; Madison, 1968). In fact, even a
review that Mischel (2009, p. 283) claimed “dismissed” his
book took the arguments presented in the book seriously (Craik,
1969). This absence of a crisis is consistent with the fact that, for
there to be a crisis, there has to be a paradigm (Leahey, 1992),
and, as observed here and elsewhere (Eysenck, 1983), personali-
ty psychology is a pre-paradigmatic science.
So is there a better description for the history of personality
psychology? The many different strands of research inherent in
personality psychology (and other social sciences) are better
described by pragmatic descriptions of progress in science.
Laudan (1977) put forward one such description of scientiﬁc
progress. He described science as a human activity designed to
solve problems, and, instead of seeing theories as being generat-
ed by an overarching, dominant paradigm, Laudan proposed
that theories, such as trait theory, were generated by and part of
research traditions. Successful research traditions, according to
Laudan, were those that solved more problems.
Laudan (1977) identiﬁed two broad types of problems that
are solved by research traditions. Empirical problems are those
described by Kuhn (1970) and include problems solved by one
or more theories, problems that remain unsolved, and problems
solved by one theory but not a competing theory. Importantly,
different research traditions attach different weights to different
problems (Laudan, 1977). In the case of personality psychology,
for instance, trait theorists are less concerned with how traits and
situations interact to produce behavior than are social learning
theorists. Instead, they are more concerned with, for example,
the problem of family resemblances in personality. The other
type of problems, conceptual problems, were not identiﬁed by
Kuhn and are problems with scientiﬁc theories (Laudan, 1977).
According to Laudan, conceptual problems are as important as
are empirical problems, and not addressing these problems can
hold back a research tradition. For example, despite its clear
ability to answer empirical problems about species diversity and
to make novel predictions, conceptual problems, such as a belief
in an unchanging natural world, prevented the acceptance of
Darwin’s evolutionary theory (Mayr, 1972).
An obvious question then is, how well do research traditions
that include trait theory solve empirical and conceptual problems
about animal behavior? Individual differences in animal behav-
ior were probably apparent to humans ever since we began inter-
acting with animals. Moreover, as others (e.g., Gosling, 2001)
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have noted, the origins of the scientiﬁc study of animal personal-
ity can be traced to Charles Darwin and major ﬁgures within
psychology, including Ivan Pavlov, Robert Yerkes, and Donald
Hebb. However, animal personality research up until the 1970s
by comparative psychologists—which included studies of
development, learning, behavior genetics, immune responses,
and structure—was sporadic (seeWeiss & Gartner, 2017).
The burst of research into animal personality that followed
these initial investigations came largely from biology, proba-
bly because trait theory proved to be an especially good prob-
lem solver in behavioral ecology. An offshoot of classic
ethology, the study of animal behavior in natural conditions,
behavioral ecology seeks answers to Tinbergen’s (1963)
questions about the proximate (the physiological mechanisms
and environmental conditions leading to a behavior and how
the behavior develops during the individual’s life) and ulti-
mate (what the behavior’s function is and how it has evolved)
explanations for animal behavior. One core tenet of behavior-
al ecology is that species evolve to behave optimally under
environmental conditions (Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990).
For example, a behavioral ecologist may devise models to
predict how long birds of a particular species will search for
food within a patch. The parameters of this model could
include how long they have been exploiting a patch, the ener-
gy they will expend and risks they will take in ﬁnding a new
patch, and how likely the new patch is to be better than the
patch they are currently exploiting.
Behavioral ecology had been quite successful at explaining
animal behavior (Krebs & Davies, 1997). However, like
humans, all animals within a species do not behave as predicted
by their models. As described elsewhere (e.g., Reale, Reader,
Sol, McDougall, & Dingemanse, 2007), for a long time, the sta-
tistical models used by behavioral ecologists relegated the varia-
tion around the optimum behavior to the error term. According
to Reale and his colleagues, the situation changed with the publi-
cation of a study on stickleback ﬁsh. The ﬁsh in this study dis-
played individual differences in behavior that were consistent
across different stages of their breeding cycle and in the presence
of different intruders, and the ﬁsh that displayed more aggres-
sion in the behavioral tests were more likely to explore new
environments (Huntingford, 1976).
These results, and those in other species, did not lead evolu-
tionary biologists (e.g., Wilson, Clark, Coleman, & Dearstyne,
1994) to suggest that the effects of environmental conditions or
development were less important than individual differences or
that interactions instead of main effects should be studied. Evo-
lutionary biologists also did not describe these ﬁndings as lead-
ing to a crisis or as causing a paradigm shift. Instead, a research
tradition emerged to solve the problem, and its rapid growth tes-
tiﬁes to its ability to do so. Personality traits are at the core of
this tradition.
One empirical problem that this research tradition addressed
is the question of why behavioral variation exists, especially as
studies of nonhuman animals have found that additive genetic
effects underlie this variation (Van Oers, De Jong, Van
Noordwijk, Kempenaers, & Drent, 2005). This phenomenon is
puzzling because, as noted by Fisher, directional selection
should exhaust the additive genetic variation underlying a trait
(see Penke, Denissen, & Miller, 2007, for a discussion). It is
also puzzling because, if an animal is to survive and reproduce,
the best behavioral strategy would be to be ﬂexible enough so
that its behavior can match whatever is optimal for a particular
time and environment (Reale et al., 2007; Sih, Bell, Johnson, &
Ziemba, 2004).
Several evolutionary mechanisms have been developed to
explain the presence of persistent, heritable variation in behavior
(Dingemanse &Wolf, 2010; Penke et al., 2007). Although there
is not enough space to cover all of these mechanisms, it is worth
discussing those that have received the most attention in some
detail.
One possibility is that personality variation is maintained by
the accumulation of mutations that do not inﬂuence survival or
reproductive success (Kimura, 1983). However, traits are associ-
ated with survival and reproductive success (see Smith &
Blumstein, 2008, for a review). Readers familiar with the human
personality literature are no doubt familiar with ﬁndings of asso-
ciations between personality and health (Deary, Weiss, & Batty,
2010), and between personality and reproductive success
(Alvergne, Jokela, & Lummaa, 2010; Eaves, Martin, Heath,
Hewitt, & Neale, 1990; Jokela, Alvergne, Pollet, & Lummaa,
2011).
A second possibility is that balancing selection maintains
variation in personality. This possibility is supported by studies
of birds, lizards, insects, small mammals, and ungulates that ﬁnd
that whether, and in what direction, a personality trait is associat-
ed with survival and reproduction varies across environments,
time, and/or developmental stages (for reviews, see Dingemanse
& Reale, 2013; Dingemanse & Wolf, 2010). For example, in
one study, Dingemanse, Both, Drent, and Tinbergen (2004) cap-
tured wild great tits and measured how often and how rapidly
they explored a novel laboratory environment. They then
released the birds into the wild and followed them over three
winters: Availability of the birds’ preferred food during the ﬁrst
winter was poor, availability of the birds’ preferred food during
the second winter was good, and availability of the birds’ pre-
ferred food during the third winter was poor. Among males,
across the three winters, exploration scores were associated with
lower, higher, and lower survival rates, respectively; for female
birds, the pattern was in the opposite direction. Moreover,
female personality was associated with breeding success, though
this also ﬂuctuated across years: In winters during which food
was scarce, females with high or low exploration scores had
poorer breeding success; in the winter during which food was
abundant, females with average scores had poorer breeding
success.
Nicolaus, Tinbergen, Ubels, Both, and Dingemanse (2016)
found that the association between exploration and ﬁtness in
great tits also varied as a function of population density: Faster
explorers were favored when the population density was low;
slower explorers were favored when the population density was
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high. Critically, although birds changed their behavior as a func-
tion of population density, it was in the opposite direction of
what one would expect if doing so was to maximize ﬁtness:
Birds became faster explorers when the population density was
high and slower explorers when the population density was low.
A third possibility is that personality variation is maintained
by trade-offs related to differences in life-history strategy. The
concept of a life-history strategy is that of a continuum, and it
was originally used to characterize species or populations
(MacArthur & Wilson, 1963). One end of this continuum
described the so-called “fast” life-history strategy. Species or
populations with a fast life history would breed early and often,
but at the expense of longevity and offspring survival. The other
end of this continuum described the so-called “slow” life-history
strategy. Species or populations with a slow life history would
breed later and less frequently, but they had longer lives and
more surviving offspring. Life-history strategies have been
extended to describe differences between individuals within spe-
cies and populations (Reale et al., 2010). Because different life-
history strategies have similar ﬁtness payoffs (MacArthur &
Wilson, 1963), the variation of any personality trait associated
with life history should be maintained (Biro & Stamps, 2008;
Wolf, Van Doorn, Leimar, &Weissing, 2007).
There is considerable support for the possibility that person-
ality variation is maintained because personality traits are associ-
ated with life-history strategy. For example, in a study of
bighorn sheep rams, Reale, Martin, Coltman, Poissant, and
Festa-Bianchet (2009) tested whether two personality traits,
boldness and docility, were genetically correlated and whether
genetic tendencies for these traits were associated with survival
and reproductive success. Boldness was operationally deﬁned as
the tendency of an individual to enter a baited trap. Docility was
operationally deﬁned as reactions to being handled by humans.
Variation in boldness and docility were associated with life-
history trade-offs. Boldness and docility were also heritable and
negatively genetically correlated.Moreover, the predicted genet-
ic values of boldness and docility were related to longer life
spans and late-life reproductive success. Evidence also comes
from a study of crickets. In their study, Niemel€a, Dingemanse,
Alioravainen, Vainikka, and Kortet (2013) examined whether
personality variation was maintained by life-history strategy
trade-offs. They found that, although there was an association
between a measure related to life history (body size) and a per-
sonality trait (de-freezing), there was little evidence for a genetic
correlation between the two. Based on these results, the authors
concluded that common environmental inﬂuences were respon-
sible for the association.
A fourth possibility put forward is that personality variation
is maintained because of the existence of genetically or environ-
mentally mediated correlations between traits, which are known
as behavioral syndromes to behavioral ecologists (Sih et al.,
2004). These correlations can occur within contexts, such as the
case of brown capuchin monkeys: Individuals high on a person-
ality dimension labeled assertiveness tend to be more aggres-
sive, dominant, and independent, but less fearful and cautious
(see Table 6 inMorton et al., 2013, for all of the loadings). These
correlations can also occur across contexts: Recall, for example,
the ﬁnding that more aggressive stickleback ﬁsh were also those
more likely to explore a new environment (Huntingford, 1976).
In the cases of both brown capuchin monkeys and stickleback
ﬁsh, because the traits are correlated, being at the optimum level
of one trait (dominance in monkeys and aggressiveness in ﬁsh)
prevents one from being at the optimum level of the other trait
(cautiousness in monkeys and the tendency to explore new envi-
ronments in ﬁsh).
It is unlikely that any one of these possible mechanisms or
others that were not discussed are singularly responsible for
maintaining personality variation in nonhuman animals. How-
ever, the identiﬁcation of these mechanisms in several species
testiﬁes to this research tradition’s ability to solve problems
related to personality evolution. There is more to say about the
maintenance of personality variation, but that involves compar-
ing species, a topic that will be addressed later. Until then, it is
worth highlighting how successful this research tradition has
been in solving another problem, namely, identifying the proxi-
mate bases of individual differences in animal behavior.
With respect to identifying the physiological bases of animal
personality, some of the most convincing work comes from
selection studies and studies of coping styles. Animal breeders
have long known that breeding (or selecting) for physical traits
can lead to changes in behavioral traits or the other way around.
In a classic selection study, Dmitry Belyaev bred foxes for tame-
ness for over 40 years (Trut, Oskina, & Kharlamova, 2009). In
several respects, the tame foxes behaved more like domesticated
dogs than wild foxes and also differed from wild foxes in their
rate of development and neuroendocrine proﬁles (Trut et al.,
2009). Other ﬁndings from this study are also worth highlight-
ing. For one, compared to wild foxes, the tame foxes retained
youthful features, but they reached sexual maturity earlier and
showed higher levels of reproductive hormones (Trut et al.,
2009). Also, during development, foxes display a reduction in
their exploratory behavior and an increase in glucocorticoids,
both of which mark the end of their sensitive socialization peri-
od; these changes occurred later in tame foxes than in their wild
counterparts (Trut et al., 2009).
Another selection study compared birds (great tits) selected
to be fast or slow explorers of novel environments (Van Oers,
Buchanan, Thomas, & Drent, 2011). Fast explorers had better
immune functioning and lower testosterone levels than slow
explorers. The latter ﬁndings surprised Van Oers et al., as fast
explorers are more aggressive. However, this difference may
mean that, like Belyaev’s domesticated foxes, birds selected for
lower levels of a trait related to aggression more rapidly reached
sexual maturity.
Coping style in the animal personality literature refers to a
suite of behavioral and physiological tendencies related to how
individual animals react to stressors (Koolhaas et al., 1999). At
one end of this spectrum are “proactive” individuals. At the oth-
er are “reactive” individuals. In behavioral tests, proactive indi-
viduals, for example, attack more quickly and are more likely to
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engage in defensive behavior (Koolhaas et al., 1999, Table 2).
Animals with a proactive coping style also differ with respect to
their hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis activity, HPA
axis reactivity, and parasympathetic reactivity, all of which are
low relative to animals with a reactive coping style (Koolhaas
et al., 1999, Table 3). Finally, the sympathetic and testosterone
reactivity of individuals with a proactive coping style are high
compared to individuals who have a reactive coping style (Kool-
haas et al., 1999, Table 3).
Differences in neurophysiology have also been identiﬁed as
proximate explanations for personality variation. One MRI
study of 74 chimpanzees found that the percentage of gray mat-
ter in the brain, but not the asymmetry of the brain’s subgenual
cingulate cortex region, was associated with lower dominance
and higher conscientiousness (Blatchley & Hopkins, 2010). Per-
sonality measures were derived by questionnaire ratings: Domi-
nance was composed of traits related to boldness, fearlessness,
assertiveness, and aggressiveness; conscientiousness was com-
posed of traits related to self-control, predictability, and emo-
tional stability (Weiss, King, & Hopkins, 2007). A later study of
107 chimpanzees by Latzman, Hecht, Freeman, Schapiro, and
Hopkins (2015) found associations between personality and oth-
er brain regions: The volume and asymmetry of the frontal
region of the brain’s gray matter were associated with higher
dominance and extraversion, the latter being related to sociabili-
ty, activity, and other traits that make up its human counterpart
(Freeman et al., 2013). This study also found associations
between frontal gray matter volume and higher openness, a per-
sonality dimension related to exploratory behavior and curiosity
(Freeman et al., 2013), and between frontal gray matter asym-
metry and higher reactivity/unpredictability, a personality
dimension related to low conscientiousness (Freeman et al.,
2013).
Unfortunately, despite the fact that researchers have gathered
an enormous amount of data on the association between person-
ality and human survival and reproductive success (see above),
one would be at pains to make the case that this research tradi-
tion has been successful at solving problems related to the
human personality evolution. This may be attributable to a ten-
dency among some evolutionary psychologists and personality
psychologists to develop premature theories (Chamberlin, 1890/
1965) based on a narrow set of observations (i.e., studies of per-
sonality in humans). Among evolutionary psychologists, this
takes the form of ascribing functions to human personality
dimensions based on the commonsense meanings of their
names, which itself may be a holdover from functionalism
(Degler, 1991). For example, Nettle (2006) hypothesized that
the beneﬁts of extraversion included mating success, having
more social allies, and being more willing to explore the envi-
ronment, and that its costs included physical risks and family
instability. This tendency is not limited to evolutionary psychol-
ogists. For example, a review argued that kin selection and
reciprocal altruism are better captured by the HEXACO model
than by the Five-Factor Model or Big Five (Ashton & Lee,
2007). Another possibility is that there is a problem with trait
theory; however, comparative personality research has
highlighted trait theory’s ability to solve problems concerning
personality evolution in humans and other animals.
The comparative method involves comparing species and
using the evolutionary history of those species to conduct natu-
ral experiments (see Gosling & Graybeal, 2007, for an over-
view). One can apply this method to study personality structure
and associations between personality traits and other variables,
and to determine whether certain features of species led to differ-
ences in mean levels of traits. For example, by comparing differ-
ently related species that do or do not face similar evolutionary
challenges based on, say, their different systems of social orga-
nization or the ecologies in which they live, one can test whether
mean levels of a trait and the presence of a personality dimen-
sion are features inherited from a common ancestor or are
evolved adaptations to that environment or social organization
(Gosling & Graybeal, 2007). A strong test of whether some
physical or behavioral trait is inherited from a common ancestor
involves comparing closely related species that evolved in dif-
ferent habitats, societies, and so on. If these species resemble
one another in that trait, the most parsimonious explanation is
that the trait was present in a common ancestor. If they differ in
that trait, the most parsimonious explanation is that the trait
evolved recently. Conversely, a strong test of whether a trait is
derived (i.e., evolved recently) is to compare that trait in distant-
ly related species that evolved in similar habitats, societies, and
so on. The similarities between these species are most parsimo-
niously explained as adaptations to those environments. The
explanatory or problem-solving power of the comparative meth-
od, when applied to evolutionary questions about personality,
can be highlighted by some examples.
Compared to other primates, humans are an intensely social,
altruistic species (Kurzban, Burton-Chellew, & West, 2015).
This salient fact about our species probably explains why some
researchers (see the examples of Nettle, 2006, and Ashton &
Lee, 2007, above) hypothesize that the evolutionary bases of
personality variation can be traced to sociality. However, on a
broad level, personality variation in social traits has been identi-
ﬁed in species ranging from the highly social chimpanzee (King
& Figueredo, 1997) to semi-solitary and solitary species, such
as orangutans (Weiss, King, & Perkins, 2006) and octopuses
(Mather & Anderson, 1993). These ﬁndings are contrary to
what one would expect if these traits or their structure were
adaptations for life in social groups.
There are also problems with tying social traits or their struc-
ture to kin selection, the tendency of individuals within a species
to help related individuals at a cost to themselves (Hamilton,
1964). For one, across primate species, social and mating sys-
tems (Crook & Gartlan, 1966) and the level of paternal care
(Fernandez-Duque, Valeggia, & Mendoza, 2009) vary consider-
ably. Still, factor-analytic studies of personality in chimpanzees,
a species with a promiscuous mating system, and studies of
western lowland gorillas and Hanuman langurs, both species in
which one male monopolizes access to multiple females, reveal
distinct extraversion and agreeableness dimensions (Gold &
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Maple, 1994; King & Figueredo, 1997; Konecˇna et al., 2008).
Mountain gorillas, curiously, only possess a single dimension,
sociability, comprising traits related to extraversion and agree-
ableness (Eckardt et al., 2015). Extraversion and agreeableness
therefore emerge in species that likely differ with respect to how
much information males have about who they are related to, and
so probably emerged long before the ancestors of modern
humans were on the evolutionary stage.
Similar problems mar explanations based on reciprocal altru-
ism, the tendency to help unrelated individuals because doing so
might lead them to help you in the future (Trivers, 1971). For
one, reciprocal altruism is less likely to evolve in species where
individuals do not regularly encounter one another or in species
where individuals would be unable to recognize one another.
The presence of separate agreeableness and extraversion dimen-
sions in orangutans (Weiss et al., 2006), a semi-solitary species,
but not in brown capuchin monkeys (Morton et al., 2013) or
mountain gorillas (Eckardt et al., 2015), both social primate spe-
cies, is not consistent with what one would predict if the evolu-
tionary bases of extraversion, agreeableness, or honesty-
humility were evolutionary products of reciprocal altruism. On
the other hand, a study of six macaque species by Adams et al.
(2015) found that the personality dimensions deﬁned by traits
related to assertiveness, social conﬁdence, and aggression are
shaped by the degree to which the species were despotic as
opposed to tolerant (Thierry, 2000).
Evolutionary accounts of openness to experience (openness)
and of conscientiousness dimensions also stand on clay feet.
Perhaps this reﬂects the (probably correct) view that these
dimensions are partly responsible for many of the greatest
human accomplishments. Insofar as the beneﬁts and costs of
openness are framed in terms of creativity, such as being more
sexually attractive, but more prone to psychotic disorders (Net-
tle, 2006), this evolutionary explanation evokes the image of the
mad (sexy?) creative person. However, evidence for openness
dimensions across several nonhuman primate species, including
ﬁve macaque species (Adams et al., 2015), white-faced capu-
chin monkeys (Manson & Perry, 2013), brown capuchin mon-
keys (Morton et al., 2013), common marmosets (Iwanicki &
Lehmann, 2015), and mountain gorillas (Eckardt et al., 2015),
but not in other species, including Hanuman langurs (Konecˇna
et al., 2008) and the large-brained orangutans (Weiss et al.,
2006), suggests that openness evolved for more prosaic reasons.
Given this, the absence of an association between openness and
psychosis (Boyette et al., 2013) should not be surprising.
Explanations informed by human personality research for the
evolution of conscientiousness have also been put forward. One
possibility raised is that conscientiousness enables costly signal-
ing (Buss, 2009) or reﬂects a balance between delayed mating
and longer life (Nettle, 2006). If true, these explanations would
predict that conscientiousness should be widespread in the ani-
mal kingdom, but this is not the case (Gosling & John, 1999).
Studies of nonhuman primates and other animals appear to offer
an alternative explanation that is better supported by data. Spe-
cies that have a conscientiousness dimension, such as
chimpanzees (King & Figueredo, 1997), bonobos (Weiss et al.,
2015), and brown capuchin monkeys (Morton et al., 2013), tend
to have larger brains than species that do not. Moreover, a recent
study of 36 primate and nonprimate species that adjusted for
phylogeny found that higher self-control was associated with
larger absolute brain size and a more varied diet (MacLean et al.,
2014). However, the absence of a conscientiousness dimension
in the large-brained orangutan (Weiss et al., 2006) and its pres-
ence in the small-brained common marmoset (Iwanicki & Leh-
mann, 2015) suggests that brain size may be only partly
responsible for its evolution. For example, the ﬁnding of consci-
entiousness in common marmosets may mean that other condi-
tions, such as the need for helpers to rear young, also favor the
evolution of a conscientiousness dimension (Burkart, Hrdy, &
Van Schaick, 2009).
In contrast to the above examples, evolutionary explanations
for neuroticism often draw on the animal literature. This may be
because traits associated with neuroticism are somehow distinct
from the more salient, social aspects of human personality;
because of the fact that dimensions like neuroticism are found in
so many species (Gosling & John, 1999); or because, by focus-
ing solely on humans, it is difﬁcult to come up with a way in
which high neuroticism is beneﬁcial. For example, Nettle
(2006) suggested that the costs of neuroticism, such as poorer
health and being at greater risk of psychological disorders, are
offset by increased vigilance. Focusing on just the African apes,
this explanation is consistent with neuroticism featuring in the
personality structures of humans (Digman, 1990) and chimpan-
zees (King & Figueredo, 1997), but not bonobos (Weiss et al.,
2015) or mountain gorillas (Eckardt et al., 2015), the latter two
having evolved in more predictable, resource-rich environments
than did humans or chimpanzees. On the other hand, this expla-
nation is not consistent with the presence of neuroticism in west-
ern lowland gorillas (Gold & Maple, 1994), which also live in a
predictable, resource-rich environment. The proposed evolution-
ary beneﬁts for neuroticism are thus perhaps wanting, and need
to be studied further.
Comparative personality research can be used to solve empir-
ical problems other than those revolving around the maintenance
of variation and/or structure. For one, comparative personality
research has enabled researchers to test whether investing in
sociocultural roles (Roberts & Jackson, 2009) or whether biolo-
gy processes (McCrae & Costa, 2003) predominate personality
development. After all, sociocultural roles of the sort that are
hypothesized to inﬂuence personality development (e.g., begin-
ning full-time work) are absent or very different in other species.
Both a study comparing chimpanzees to humans, which adjust-
ed for different rates of development between these species
(King, Weiss, & Sisco, 2008), and a similar study comparing
orangutans to chimpanzees (Weiss & King, 2015) found that the
direction and magnitude of personality age differences were
comparable across species. The ﬁndings of both studies, there-
fore, appear to rule out social roles as a cause of personality
development. There were, however, two ﬁndings that suggested
that personality development is a product of natural selection.
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First, unlike humans and chimpanzees, orangutans declined in
agreeableness, suggesting that age-related increases in human
and chimpanzee agreeableness may be an adaptation for living
among unrelated conspeciﬁcs, a cross that orangutans do not
have to bear (Weiss & King, 2015). Second, unlike humans,
orangutans, and female chimpanzees, there was a leveling off of
age-related declines in extraversion among male chimpanzees
(King et al., 2008; Weiss & King, 2015). This difference may
reﬂect adaptation for heightened levels of aggression in chim-
panzee males (Wrangham,Wilson, &Muller, 2006).
The comparative approach has also been used to explain
why people who are lower in neuroticism and higher in the
other four human personality dimensions tend to be happier
(DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Steel, Schmidt, & Shultz, 2008).
Similar associations between personality and subjective well-
being have been found in nonhuman primates (King & Lan-
dau, 2003; L. M. Robinson et al., 2016; Weiss, Adams, Wid-
dig, & Gerald, 2011; Weiss et al., 2009) and in felids
(Gartner, Powell, & Weiss, 2016). These studies, as well as
those demonstrating similar genetic associations between per-
sonality and subjective well-being in humans, chimpanzees,
and orangutans (see Weiss & Luciano, 2015, for a review),
suggest that these associations long predate the emergence of
humans and our societies.
A third empirical problem concerns identifying mechanisms
by which personality inﬂuences human health (Deary et al.,
2010). An 18-year follow-up of western lowland gorillas found
that more extraverted gorillas lived longer, but no associations
between mortality and personality dimensions related to agree-
ableness, neuroticism, or a dominance dimension (Weiss, Gart-
ner, Gold, & Stoinski, 2013). Another prospective study found
associations between lower aggressiveness, lower mellowness,
and higher excitability, and morbidity in golden snub-nosed
monkeys (Jin, Su, Tao, Guo, & Yu, 2013). This same study
found that extraversion was related to higher morbidity in youn-
ger monkeys but lower morbidity in older monkeys (Jin et al.,
2013). Experimental studies have highlighted the likelihood that
some common factor or factors underlie personality traits related
to sociability and immune system robustness in rhesus maca-
ques, and that these effects are moderated in that they show up
in unstable social environments (Capitanio, 2011). These and
similar ﬁndings (see, e.g., Mehta & Gosling, 2008, for a review)
should lead one to search for variables in addition to health
behaviors (e.g., smoking, alcohol consumption, and diet) that
may explain associations between personality and health.
In addition to showing how a research tradition that
includes personality trait theory can solve empirical problems
about animal and even human personality, it is worth
highlighting how trait theory and its alternatives give rise to
and solve conceptual problems. Trait theories clash with the
view that with the “right” kinds of environmental inputs,
humans can improve their lot and create better societies. Con-
versely, this belief suggests that our failings, and those of
society, can be traced back to the “wrong” kinds of environ-
mental inputs. Sociocognitive theories of personality that
“recognize that men can and do reconceptualize themselves
and change, and that an understanding of how humans can
constructively modify their behavior in systematic ways”
(Mischel, 1968, p. 301) solve this problem by marginalizing
traits and, in fact, denying their existence outside of environ-
mental contexts. Theories such as these thus win out over trait
theory in that they are consonant with the perception that
human environments and cultures shape human behavior.
However, by adopting these views, these theories are bur-
dened with conceptual problems. Organisms whose behaviors
are ever changing will be beyond the reach of evolutionary
forces. Thus, these theories deny the continuity between our-
selves and other species. On the other hand, trait theories do
not clash with evolutionary biology and so do not require
humans to have powers over their destinies. Moreover, trait
theory is not necessarily incompatible with the values
described above. After all, accepting the effects of one vari-
able (traits) does not deny the effects of another (the environ-
ment), or that these variables may interact with one another. It
does, however, require abandoning the view that “the concep-
tual split between person and situation” is “absurd” (Mischel,
2009, p. 283), or, speaking statistically, that the presence of
an interaction makes main effects uninterpretable.
Research traditions, therefore, that include or give rise to trait
theory have been and continue to be excellent at solving prob-
lems about personality in animals and in humans. It is for this
reason that tinkering with trait theory or, worse, discarding it
would be a mistake. That said, to be useful for solving further
problems in animal personality, which will yield answers to
questions about the evolution of human personality, requires
that some features be added to trait theory.
Trait theories, such as the Five-Factor Model, start from basic
tendencies, that is, a hierarchically organized set of traits
(McCrae & Costa, 1999). This starting point may, however,
come too late to be useful when studying animals other than
humans. This was not willful. It was merely impossible to fore-
see the different ways that traits were organized in other species.
To deal with the diverse personality structures encountered in
nonhuman primates and other animals, trait theorists should
acknowledge that basic traits exist within populations and are
subject to evolutionary forces, and that, across species, different
traits may be more or less important and their organization into
higher levels may differ. Another way to think of traits, then, is
as elements and compounds (I owe the allusion to chemistry to a
2009 article byMcCrae).
Incorporating this view raises new questions about personali-
ty evolution: What are the elemental units and how do different
species come to be deﬁned by different, though sometimes over-
lapping, personality domains? Comparative personality research
can be used to dissect basic tendencies into their elemental parts.
For example, humans and chimpanzees share ﬁve domains—
neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeable-
ness, and conscientiousness—that presumably were present in
our common Pan-Homo ancestor some 5 to 6 million years ago.
However, in the process of becoming human, we “lost” a
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personality dimension related to dominance that modern-day
chimpanzees possess (King & Figueredo, 1997). This domi-
nance dimension is made up of traits related to low neuroticism,
high extraversion, low agreeableness, and both high and low
conscientiousness. These traits thus appear to be elements in that
they have combined or split apart over a relatively short period
of evolutionary time, either because of genetic drift or because
different selection pressures were acting on the personalities of
chimpanzees and humans during their evolution (see Weiss
et al., 2015, for the case of conscientiousness).
In closing, it is worth reconsidering the absence of a para-
digm in personality psychology. Would personality psychology
be better off if it adopted a paradigm (see Eysenck, 1983, for a
discussion)? My own view is that, at its current stage of develop-
ment, personality psychology would be better off if it delayed
gratiﬁcation and remained a pluralistic discipline. This would
allow other research traditions, such as contemporary accounts
of the self that incorporate stable traits (M. D. Robinson &
Sedikides, 2009), to emerge and try their hand at problem solv-
ing alongside research traditions that emphasize trait theory.
This may sound utopian, but the lack of a single paradigm or
research tradition in chemistry was arguably responsible for its
success and development into a mature science (Chang, 2012).
There is no reason why this should not be true, too, for the scien-
tiﬁc study of persons, even if they are animals.
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